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Abstract: Despite their laudable intent, extraterritorial legal initiatives to promote corporate
sustainability development have not been well received in practice, and are often seen as a
window-dressing exercise. This article aims to conduct a conceptual and doctrinal analysis, offering a
theoretical foundation that interprets corporate extraterritorial legislative attempts as legitimate in
the context of globalisation, using the lens of “the commons” and “the common good”. We try to link
the values and dimensions of “the commons” to the goals of corporate extraterritorial legislation,
so that lawmaking attempts with extraterritorial reach will gain additional foundational support and
achieve more effective and better controlled compliance. In particular, the article makes an original
attempt to justify and develop a new notion, namely “the extraterritorial commons”. This notion is in
harmony with, rather than contradicting, progressive legal attempts to address the mismatching and
conflicting nature of the relationship between the traditional voluntarism of corporate extraterritorial
responsibilities, particularly in relation to sustainability issues, and global trends towards more
regulation in this area.
Keywords: the commons; the common good; multinational enterprises; extraterritoriality; corporate
responsibility; extraterritorial commons
1. Introduction
Governing multinational enterprises (MNEs) requires novelty and innovation. The Organisation
for Economic Co-operation (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises clarify that MNEs “usually
comprise companies or other entities established in more than one country and so linked that they may coordinate
their operations in various ways. While one or more of these entities may be able to exercise a significant
influence over the activities of others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary widely from
one multinational enterprise to another” [1]. The adoption of an extraterritorial focus in the form of a
projection of national law abroad is clearly one of the modern legal attempts to address corporate
sustainability challenges [2] (p. 931). Indeed, this measure takes good account of the fact that breaches
of responsibility are usually committed by boards of directors, who are required by national corporate
law, corporate governance codes, regional legal solutions and other legislations to consider the interests
of wider communities of stakeholders in addition to shareholders, such as Law No 2017-399 on the
duty of vigilance of parent companies adopted in France on 27 March 2017. There are also regional
legal instruments with international effects; among the most prominent of these are a number of
EU directives towards greater transparency in MNEs’ global supply chains, such as the Directive on
non-financial disclosure.
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Despite its laudable intent, this extraterritorial legislative approach has not been well received in
practice, and is often seen as a window-dressing exercise [3,4]. This is hardly surprising. After all,
international business has no frontiers, but state-centred legal systems do. The domestic nature of
state legal systems in general, and corporate laws in particular, struggles to adjust to the expanding
reach of MNEs [5] (p. 335). Up to now the notion of extraterritorial legislation, by which State A
applies its law to, and accepts jurisdiction over, activities by third parties in State B, remains alien
to many jurisdictions’ legal systems [2] (p. 939). This article aims to offer a concrete conceptual
channel for persuasive and plausible arguments to support more effective and enforceable corporate
extraterritorial responsibility through the lens of “the commons” and “the common good”. It is
hoped that this conceptual channel will lay further a legitimate foundation for future extraterritorial
legal developments, as those that occur “when states establish jurisdiction in regard to activities which
partly or fully happen outside their territory” [6]. We try to link the values and dimensions of ”the
commons” that we have contextualised from secondary sources, such as sharing, trust, responsibility,
cooperation, solidarity, justice, fairness and morality [7], to the goals of corporate extraterritorial
legislation, so that lawmaking attempts with extraterritorial reach will gain additional foundational
support, reconcile better with existing corporate law frameworks, and achieve more effective and
better controlled compliance.
Additional to contributions in the legal development field, we also hope the paper will stimulate
discussions on and expand the reach of a variety of schools of thought, including progressive corporate
law theory, sustainability development, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and corporate and board
accountability. While it would be wrong to simply brush off the valuable attempts made by a number of
schools of thought—for instance, the stakeholder model [8,9] and the institutional theory [10,11]—there
remain significant theoretical gaps when these are used to support the legitimacy of demanding
extraterritorial accountability of MNEs in the light of economic globalisation. When applied in a
transnational or extraterritorial context, the effectiveness of these theories is limited by various factors
such as the lack of explicit contracts between MNEs and extraterritorial stakeholders, disparities in the
understanding and application of CSR between different jurisdictions, and the weak position or power
of extraterritorial stakeholders, who are particularly vulnerable to corporate decisions and behaviours
reflected in policymaking. A concrete theoretical framework of corporate extraterritorial responsibility
is therefore a necessity, within which the conceptions of “the commons” and “the common good” can
be expected to play a central role.
Until now, notions of “the commons” and “the common good” have not been broadly applied
in arguments surrounding the promotion of corporate sustainability, not to mention extraterritorial
initiatives. The commons, as a “common paradigm” for social movements and beyond [12], refers to
how society and communities enable people to collaborate and share through collective action and
solidarity [13] (p. 27). In a global economy in favour of economic rationalism and individual interests,
these concepts are often regarded as alternatives to the profit-oriented appropriation of common
resources [14,15]. However, we argue that the nature and scope of those two terms should be expanded,
not only to justify extraterritorial legislative attempts, but also to give legitimacy to board members
to duly consider the interests of extraterritorial stakeholders, given that the terms refer to a common
pool of resources of all varieties with no territorial boundaries. Thus, these concepts could usefully
fill the above-mentioned existing theoretical gaps, and in particular offer jurisprudential support for
extraterritorial legalisation attempts.
In this manner, a rationale analysis of extraterritorial responsibilities through the lens of the
commons and the common good leans heavily on the answers to two increasingly important theoretical
questions, to which this paper now turns. First, appreciating the existing theoretical limits of corporate
extraterritorial responsibility, does the pursuit of the common good (ethical concerns) and the commons
(economic concerns) contribute to explicating the legitimacy and significance of corporate legal
extraterritorial responsibilities? Second, suppose the answer to the first question is yes, how could
we define and develop these concepts to fill existing doctrinal and theoretical voids for legalising
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corporate extraterritorial responsibility to enhance corporate compliance, and to reconcile conflicts
among stakeholders and MNEs in the context of globalisation?
This is a significant attempt not just in the legal sense; it also has broad-spectrum relevance to the
reconciliation of the interests of business and stakeholder groups and the creation of more sustainable
businesses. Externally, the analysis hopes to make a contribution to vulnerable community engagement,
economic wellbeing and social cohesion by supporting NGOs, government agencies and policy makers
to gain a better understanding of the rationale, importance and possible approaches for protecting
extraterritorial stakeholders through corporate law. This will reduce the risk of irresponsible corporate
behaviours by MNEs beyond their home jurisdictions in order to build successful corporations which
make positive contributions to wider society. Internally, heightened awareness and understanding of
the notion of “the extraterritorial commons” may assist board members to clearly map stakeholder
coalitions and construct a matrix of stakeholder priorities in global corporate networks when making
business judgements.
In particular, the article makes an original attempt not only at linking the notions of
“the commons” with extraterritorial corporate legal responsibility, but also at justifying extraterritorial
corporate responsibility by way of developing a new notion, namely “the extraterritorial commons”.
Previous discussions on “the commons” or “the common good” in corporate contexts have discounted
the sharp imbalance between the strong positions of MNEs and the vulnerable positions of stakeholders
in developing countries, as well as variations in different ideas of “the good”, and in turn have been
inadequate in contributing to possible legislative approaches to promote extraterritorial responsibility
to mitigate these issues. “The extraterritorial commons” may fill this gap, given that it conveniently
refers to resources that are consumed by MNEs but which are geographically located outside the
territory where they are registered or which is their main business location. These resources may well
include nature resources such as soil, clean water, raw materials and human resources, since one of
the main drivers for MNEs to operate in developing countries is cheap labour, and one of the main
impacts of global supply chains relates to workers’ rights. Furthermore, in the context of MNEs,
the human-centric notion of “the commons” could be applied as a useful lens to connect “the common
good” for society at large and the personal good for individual stakeholders in globalised supply
chains or MNEs’ subsidiaries within groups of companies.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a comprehensive review of the current theoretical
explanations of imposing extraterritorial legal responsibilities on MNEs, and the challenges associated
with this. An introduction to the methodology is provided in Section 3. Section 4 contextualises, rationalises
and critically evaluates the current legislative approaches to the extraterritorial responsibilities of
MNEs. Section 5 situates “the commons” and “the common good” within the corporate environment,
and builds links between these notions and extraterritorial corporate responsibility. Section 6 proposes
a new notion of “the extraterritorial commons” for a more inclusive legalising approach, reshaping the
mandatory features of corporate extraterritorial accountability to achieve the ultimate goal of “the
common good”. As will be seen, this notion can be expected to play a central role in the theoretical
framework legitimising extraterritorial legal initiatives related to corporate activities. Following
the limitations of the study and some suggestions for future research, finally, there will be some
concluding remarks.
2. Literature Review
The protection of social, environmental and human rights issues is far from adequate, not just in
real-life practice, but also in related research, greatly owing to the fact that both corporate structures
and globalised operations facilitate corporate evasion of state jurisdiction. These gaps, which are
created by the transnational nature of MNEs and the complexity of sustainability issues affecting a
wide range of stakeholders, need to be filled through legal approaches with extraterritorial reach,
which both existing corporate law principles and business ethics theories struggle to accommodate.
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2.1. Challenges to Existing Corporate Law Principles
Despite their progressive legislative goals, extraterritorial legal initiatives, such as the transparency
requirement embedded in s.54 of the UK Modern Slavery Act (MSA), are seemingly incompatible with
traditional conceptions of state sovereignty [16] (p. 270) and the shareholder primacy norm [17,18],
which underpins mainstream corporate laws and remains the default dogma in many jurisdictions,
most prominently the UK and the US [19,20]. For instance, if one body corporate within a multinational
group engages in wrongdoing, the domestic nature of corporate laws and the separate legal personality
orthodoxy would effectively shield other group members from being sued or liable [21,22]. In the
meantime, the distributions of power and control in MNEs have been arranged in ways that conveniently
surpass territorial boundaries, mostly with a parent company being a “national” in one jurisdiction
and its various subsidiaries being “nationals” in other jurisdictions where they operate [23,24] (p. 599).
It is thus not surprising that MNEs are regarded as operating “in a legal vacuum” with respect to their
cross-border activities [2] (p. 934).
Additional to the obstacles created by conventional nation-based corporate law doctrines to the
exercise of corporate extraterritorial responsibility, the overwhelming influence of shareholder primacy
in both corporate governance practices and company laws of many jurisdictions, which recognise the
maximisation of shareholders’ wealth as corporations’ fundamental objective [25,26] (p. 577), have also
obstructed extraterritorial legal endeavours on corporations. Although a corporate responsibility to
consider non-shareholder stakeholders’ interests during business operations has been acknowledged
as a well-established social norm, the nature, substantive content and scope of this responsibility thus
far still remain controversial. In the corporate context, and as a consequence, it has been commonly
tackled by company-based voluntary initiatives, far from legal mandates and litigation [27,28].
2.2. Challenges to the Institutional Theory
Institutional theory highlights the role of institutions in promoting CSR, and in using CSR as an
avenue to investigate various ways to ease the boundaries between business and society [10]. The
theory regards CSR as a notion that is institutionally contingent, taking different forms based on
various national or institutional contexts. The theory greatly facilitates a better understanding of CSR
in relation to the diversity and the dynamics of the concept [29]. These diversified conceptions of CSR
implicate cross-national variations in CSR practices, whereas the dynamics of the notion indicate that
the practice of CSR has also been constantly evolving through imitation and adaptation, and assuming
varying manifestations in different jurisdictions [10] (p. 8).
That being said, applying institutional theory to explicate CSR in the cross-national dimension
needs to be complemented not only with “homogeneity and consensus” but also with “heterogeneity
and contestation around the meaning and practice of CSR” [30] (p. 57). For instance, while current
institutional theory work recognises the “institutional duality” of an MNEs’ subsidiaries as these
subsidiaries face dual internal and external pressures, by conforming to requirements from both the
host country and the parent company [31,32], the theory does not explain the institutional role played
by the MNE as a whole, and the sovereignty implications of the multiple cross-border dimensions in
which it operates its CSR practices. Although the current institutional analysis may justify diverse
legislative approaches for regulating CSR in different countries, it cannot justify the necessity or provide
a rationale for a nation imposing its extraterritorial legal forces on cross-border commercial entities.
2.3. Challenges to Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder theory is a theory of organisational management and business ethics that cares for the
interests of multiple constituencies impacted by corporations, such as employees, suppliers, customers,
creditors, local communities, and others [33]. Parallel to the global CSR movement, the theory helps to
explicate the practical and systematic perspectives of CSR, bridging the gap between CSR theory and
company practice. A number of terms derived from the theory, including stakeholder management,
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stakeholder communication, stakeholder scrutiny and stakeholder partnership, are among the most
often discussed concepts in the domain of CSR [34]. Legal scholars likewise use the theory to
rationalise progressive corporate law approaches such as directors’ duties towards stakeholders [35,36].
However, stakeholder theory has been criticised for its limitations in balancing stakeholders’ interests
and the unpoliced managerial discretion of directors [37,38]. One acute problem facing stakeholder
theory, as pointed out, is the difficulty of resolving the tensions among conflicting stakeholders’
interests [39], since preferences for certain groups of primary stakeholders are always highly subjective.
The theory is also in need of clear criteria to normatively categorise the rights corresponding to each
stakeholder group [40].
The disadvantages of stakeholder theory may be more prominent when applied to the case
of extraterritorial responsibilities. This theory, which views a corporation as a locus in relation to
wider external stakeholders’ interests, focuses on protecting the interests of non-shareholders in
general, without highlighting the divisions between stakeholders in the home and extraterritorial
jurisdictions. Lack of criteria in terms of stakeholder ranking also makes it difficult to maintain a
consistent approach when ascertaining the identities and rankings of extraterritorial stakeholders.
For some MNEs’ extraterritorial stakeholders, such as local people who are harmed by the pollution
emitted from an MNE’s overseas’ subsidiary, they will not be able to ex ante contract with the MNE
in a direct or fair manner that protects their legitimate interests. Those groups of extraterritorial
stakeholders without contractual ties to the corporations are particularly vulnerable, as it is proven to
be hard for them to assert their rights to the MNE, or to raise direct legal claims for such rights against
the MNE, in the absence of a contractual relationship [41,42]. This is made even more challenging by the
complexity of global supplier chains and corporate groups, which adds the separate legal personality
concern into the overall picture, as discussed in Section 2.1. For some corporations, they may also
have explanations for their deliberate ignorance of the interests of certain extraterritorial stakeholders,
in circumstances where serving extraterritorial stakeholders’ interests would not only sacrifice the
legitimate rights of other stakeholders who have explicit contracts with the companies, but also affect
the wealth-creation capability of companies, and thus risk infringing the sanctity of shareholder
primacy, as previously explicated.
The table (Table 1) below displays the relevant theories, the source of the theories, and dimensions
of the arguments:
Table 1. Theories, Sources and Dimensions of the Arguments.
Theories Sources Dimensions
conceptions of state sovereignty [16] incompatibility with extraterritorial initiatives
shareholder primacy norm [17–20,25,26] conflicts between the norm and mandatory CSR,including extraterritorial attempts
separate legal entities [23,24]
being separate legal entities, whether parent
companies should be responsible or accountable for
the actions and decisions of their extraterritorial
subsidiaries or suppliers
limited liability principle [21,22]
limited liability principle shielding shareholders
and parents companies from liability and the
problem of corporate (extraterritorial)
irresponsibility
institutional theory
[29] diversity and the dynamics of CSR and legislativeattempts for addressing extraterritorial challenges
[10,30] blurred boundaries between business and societyand different forms of CSR (law) at national level
[31,32] “institutional duality” of MNEs’ subsidiaries




[8,9,33,34] nature and scope of (extraterritorial) stakeholders;origins and development of stakeholder theory
[37–40] criticism of the theory on its clarity, effectivenessand implementation
[35,36] connections between stakeholder theory andprogressive corporate law
[41,42] limited legal responsibility of an MNE towards itsextraterritorial stakeholders
In summary, the limitations of existing research on institutional theory or stakeholder theory
become more evident when one uses them to support extraterritorial corporate responsibilities with a
focus on instructionally bounded directors’ consideration of extraterritorial stakeholders’ interests,
which are more indirect compared with those of domestic stakeholders. In the next two sections,
support for corporations’ extraterritorial social responsibility will be discussed through the lens of “the
commons”, an angle that has somehow been overlooked.
3. Methodology
3.1. Analytical Strategies
This is a library-based study utilising a mixed methodology consisting of doctrinal, theoretical
and socio-legal research. Parts of this research will adopt the doctrinal approach, and the findings
will be based on analysing and contextualising relevant legal authorities, primarily statutes and case
law. We also take an integrated theoretical approach, using philosophical, sociological and economic
theories to rationalise lawmaking endeavours in corporations’ extraterritorial responsibility. This also
evidences the interdisciplinary nature of the research. While theoretical analysis forms a central thread
in the article, the discussions of the importance of legalising extraterritorial corporate responsibility
and theoretical supports for the conceptions of “the commons”, “the common good” and “the tragedy
of the commons” are also inherently socio-legal, as the law is a social phenomenon after all, as pointed
out by Cotterrell [43] (p. 296). Lady Hale, the former president of the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom, also highlighted the significance of this approach, particularly the fact that a number of
socio-legal studies had been cited in court [44]. The approach is functional and appropriate to interpret
and clarify an ambiguous field of law, such as extraterritorial responsibility, in its social context of
the dominance of MNEs and their incompetence in addressing extraterritorial environmental and
social challenges.
3.2. Methodology Framework
The methodology framework (Figure 1) consists of theoretical, doctrinal, interdisciplinary and
social-legal research methods carried out in three parts of the article. First (presented in green),
we discuss the relationships between extraterritorial responsibility and current mainstream theories
through theoretical and doctrinal research. Second (presented in blue), it investigates the connection
between “the commons”, “the common good” and corporate extraterritorial responsibility through
theoretical research. Third (presented in grey), this study examines “the extraterritorial commons”
and its force in support of corporate extraterritorial responsibilities through doctrinal, theoretical and
interdisciplinary research.
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4. Extraterritorial Responsibilities: Forms and Applications
“Extraterritoriality of regulation has become a fact of life”, albeit a controversial one [45] (p. 93).
It is a “situation in which state powers (legislative, executive or judicial) govern relations of law
situated outside the territory of the state in question” [46] (p. 491). The extraterritoriality we discuss
in this article is a situation where state power coordinates and governs stakeholder relationships
outside the territory of the state, achieved through concurrent actions in contract, tort and other legal
means. On the theme of ethical challenges, considering the inadequacy of voluntary CSR measures at
both the domestic and global levels, a more effective regulatory response to the adverse social and
environmental externalities generated by MNEs must be advocated and achieved through “legally
binding rules together with official attempts to create such rules (to accompany) the ‘CSR journey’ at
every step” [47] (p. 317). The creation of rules for extraterritoriality in this regard is thus expected to
be one of the most important approaches in this area.
Extraterritorial legislation relates to governments’ claims to be international frontrunners in settling
global sustainability challenges. It is desirable that extraterritoriality is involved in dispute settlements
to promote corporate sustainability with the purpose of achieving justice globally, since domestic
measures and resources are unable to deal with the situation sufficiently. The most often discussed
aspect of corporate extraterritorial responsibility is normally embedded in a dimension where the
responsibilities of developed states are discharged and executed through regulating the MNEs which
regard these states as their homes.
Regulatory approaches can be dynamic in form, including disclosure rules and substantive
regulation in the extraterritorial context. They can also arise in a variety of forms, for instance, by way
of imposing extra duties on either the companies or the boards of these companies in order to align
the scope of MNEs’ international responsibility with their sphere of control [4]. An example of a
proactive disclosure approach is the supply chain disclosure requirements embedded in s.54 of the UK
MSA. However, the pragmatic effectiveness of such approaches has been criticised. It is suggested
that the UK government should improve the monitoring and enforcement of the MSA for better
compliance, and penalties should be included for non-compliance [5,48]. It is claimed that the approach
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represents a “softer” version that is almost private governance in a statutory form [49,50]. The impact
of transparency reports alone may not be sufficient to achieve positive social ends, although it is a
necessary step and may be used as a solid foundation for more accountable companies [51,52] (p. 246).
Examples of more substantive regulation include the following approaches: a due diligence
programme is adopted in s.7(1) of the UK Bribery Act 2011, which creates an offence where a company
fails to prevent bribery committed by a person associated with the company. Through the lens
of directors’ duties, an additional duty of skill, care and diligence is made available in the French
Commercial Code, which includes a section that creates an obligation for companies to prevent and
mitigate environmental, health and human rights harms resulting from their activities, including those
carried out by their subsidiaries and in their supply chains, in the form of a duty of care imposed on
parent companies (Art. L. 225-102-4 of the French Commercial Code). This extraterritorial reach may
stretch throughout the global supply chain, and victims can bring actions in France against a French
parent company for damages that have occurred in another state’s territory by its subsidiary [53].
Regional legal instruments with international effects are also seen; the most prominent of these is the
EU Directive on non-financial reporting [54].
5. “The Commons”, “the Common Good” and Extraterritoriality
The critics of mandatory extraterritorial corporate responsibilities frequently complain that such
legislation lacks a theoretical foundation, even though it may be very appealing on ethical grounds.
This void indeed makes any formulation of the corporate duty to their external stakeholders somewhat
arbitrary. In this section, we aim to link the legislative approach with “the commons” and “the common
good” in order to promote a wider acceptance of extraterritorial corporate responsibility.
5.1. “The Commons” and “the Common Good” in a Corporate Environment
The concept of “the commons” is based upon the ethics of virtue inspired by Aristotle’s
philosophy [55] (p. 224). The approach proposed by Aristotle emphasises virtues and sees corporations
primarily as communities, which inherently facilitates the usage of “the commons” in the corporate
context [56] (p. 235). The notion of “the commons” delivers the idea that the wealth and resources that
belong to all should also be protected and managed for all in a positive manner. Thus, “the common
resource pool” in a company is shared by all stakeholders and they should have a voice in relation to
it, expressed in the form of rights or even obligations, which would also guide companies towards
a sustainable direction [57]. This is particularly relevant to MNEs, which have been criticised for
generating a number of social, environmental and human rights problems in their commercial practice,
not only in corporations’ home countries but also in other countries, especially in developing countries
with lower ethical expectations, norms, inadequate statutory protection or weaker law enforcement [58].
Therefore, the scope of corporate constituencies that may legitimately enjoy “the common resource
pool” should also be enlarged beyond an MNE’s domestic territory, in order to better address global
sustainability challenges and achieve fairness and equality. “The common good” is “the overall conditions
of life in society that allow the different groups and their members to achieve their own perfection more fully and
more easily” [59]. “The common good” of corporations may be seen as the ultimate corporate objective
to foster wealth and increase the overall long-run market value of the company [60]. As key references
for business ethics, corporations are expected to make positive contributions to society, employing the
notion of “the commons” to achieve “the common good” [61].
5.2. Linking “the Commons” and “the Common Good” with Extraterritorial Corporate Responsibility
5.2.1. What Role Should MNEs Play to Promote “the Common Good”?
“The commons” elaborates a set of rules for the governance of shared resources, and the
effectiveness of this governance closely relates to two characteristics of “the commons”. These are
non-excludability, which refers to the fact that no one can be efficiently excluded from using “the
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commons”, and subtractability, which refers to the degree to which one party’s usage of a resource
diminishes others’ use [62,63] (pp. 8–9).
Considering the “vast human and financial capital, advanced technology, international footprint,
market power and financial motivation” possessed by these companies [64], and in light of the ideals
of “the commons” and “the common good”, it is only logical to expect MNEs to play a key role in
solving the daunting sustainability problems that emerge in their global operations. It is also legitimate
to impose enlarged extraterritorial responsibilities on MNEs due to the following two interrelated
reasons. First, no one in developing or the least developed countries may be excluded from using
“the commons” they are entitled to, and these commons, such as clean drinking water, are always
bounded at the local or regional level [65] (p. 215). Second, MNEs’ usage of a resource diminishes its
use by the local community. In return, MNEs should make contributions towards local communities
with less bargaining power. The governance mechanism could and should control MNEs which tend
to maximise profit from collective resources for their own shareholders’ benefit, at the cost of others’
legitimate rights to “the commons” [66]
Inherent in the management and promotion of “the common good”, the trend towards
legalised extraterritoriality is consistent with institutional arrangements in favour of “the new
commons”, through participatory governance by a community or a group of citizens collectively [23].
MNEs probably also need to do some positive thinking about the nature of their business if they are to
become proactive contributors to “the common good” or consider themselves among “the commons”
as entities with collectively-held rights against corporate resources.
5.2.2. Enforcement Measures and Participation from Extraterritorial Stakeholders
In order to achieve fairness and sustainability at the global level, a bargain must be struck:
MNEs may have access to resources and opportunities in a jurisdiction, but they must also shoulder
the burden of being held liable. Therefore, the enforcement of laws that aim to address extraterritorial
sustainability challenges is key, and this may come from various sources. It may involve efforts from
constituencies who are eligible to “the common good” through private enforcement. For instance,
extraterritorial responsibilities may provide redress to the multiple groups of external, internal and
extraterritorial stakeholders who fulfil the role and identity of accountees (the ones to whom the board
is accountable). A legislative attempt that is worth mentioning is s.1324 of the Australian Corporations
Act, which allows “a person whose interests have been, are or would be affected by the conduct” of a director
contravening the section to seek an injunction [67]. This provision could potentially be a model
for effective remedies for distressed stakeholders of an MNE, including extraterritorial stakeholders
connecting to subsidiaries or suppliers, particularly under circumstances where there is the prospect of
an injunction being granted [68,69].
This section of law is also evidencing legislators’ willingness to accept enlarged directorial duties,
not only along the “objective” axis but also along the “scope” axis [4]. Along the “objective” axis,
corporations should be regarded as economic institutions with a social impact as well as a profit-making
function. Along the “scope” axis, directors could be required to consider elements of extraterritoriality
so as to apply consistent sustainability standards throughout the operation of MNEs in their interactions
with suppliers or sub-contractors, regardless of whether such operations take place within or outside
the home territory of the MNEs. This duty may be enforced through the involvement of extraterritorial
stakeholders, facilitating challenges from various constituencies to ensure that boards’ decisions are in
line with the interests of domestic and extraterritorial stakeholders. Extraterritorial regulation also
demands teamwork, with contributions from stakeholders, corporations, states and inter-governmental
organisations. The contributors see the company as a team production [70,71] with the creation of
certain shared value globally. Clearly, the establishment of international governance with an element
of extraterritoriality is an enormous challenge, since it involves an expanded theoretical foundation,
developing from the notion of “the good” to clarify the nature and scope of MNEs’ objectives,
powers and duties. This new foundation requires states and MNEs to recognise the moral and political
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legitimacy of stakeholders’ rights beyond their territory. MNEs’ extraterritorial responsibilities require
harmonisation, convergence, shared responsibility and legal accountability that take into account the
rights of stakeholders of their subsidiaries, suppliers and “the commons”.
To summarise, the new global economic system and its social contracts will be grounded in MNEs’
accountability mechanisms that are secured by teamwork between the home state, the host state,
the MNEs themselves and their home and extraterritorial stakeholders, in order to achieve the ultimate
goal of “the common good”.
5.3. Mitigating the Implications of Various Ideas of “the Good”
One of the conceptual difficulties that is likely to be encountered in using the notions of
“the common good” and “the commons” to offer support to an extraterritorial legal approach in the
global context is the contested conceptions of “the good”. Rawls, for instance, notably addressed five
ideas of the good found in his nominal work Justice as Fairness: (1) the idea of goodness as rationality,
(2) the idea of primary goods, (3) the idea of permissible comprehensive conceptions of the good,
(4) the idea of political virtues, and (5) the idea of the good of a well-ordered (political) society [72].
In the eyes of liberal theorists, even in the political sphere, not all conceptions of the good are identical,
nor do they all demand the same degree of involvement on the part of the state [73] (p. 645). This is
not to mention the variety of conceptions of the good in religious, moral or philosophical settings,
the scope of which tends to be “general and fully comprehensive” [72]. One might thereby plausibly ask:
how to define the good that legitimises extraterritorial legal approaches?
We propose that the existence of these various ideas of the good need not cause moral harm
or unjust bias in extraterritorial legislating and implementing processes, with the following three
considerations ameliorating the implications of contested conceptions of the good, functioning at both
cognitive and pragmatic levels.
First, the good that we employ in denoting extraterritorial responsibilities resonates more with its
thin theory version, i.e., goodness as rationality [72] (p. 178). In this manner, a scheme of primary
goods including equal basic liberties and fair opportunities could undoubtedly be presented to justify
extraterritorial legislative efforts. As practice shows, existing extraterritorial legislative initiatives
have not extended to involve the pursuit of values that require aesthetic judgement. Most states’
extraterritorial legislative efforts thus far are attached only to the pursuit of primary goods, for instance,
anti-slavery initiatives in global supply chains.
Even if some advocate the thick theory of the good over the thin version, legislative and judicial
practices have proved that a partial similarity in the structure of citizens’ permissible conceptions of
the good is practicably identifiable, and permissible forms of life could gain adherence over time [74]
(p. 274). In the case of extraterritoriality, the lines of defence, i.e., limiting conditions which resolve
political disagreements, could be subtracted among people without holding a conceptual idea of
the good superior to the other versions. To take the practicality of global anti-slavery initiatives as
an example, slavery is now de jure illegal in every country. This provides a good foundation for
global anti-slavery legislative initiatives. Theoretically, various schools of thought have also managed
to explicate available justification that is mutually acceptable to citizens regardless of their varied
conceptions of the good—for instance, the neutrality theory [72,75]. While it is neither possible nor
just to allow all conceptions of the good to be pursued in way of extraterritorial legislative efforts,
a fundamental structure embodying broad principles of justice could “permit a wide range of conceptions
fully worthy of human life” [72] (p. 258) without running afoul of moral egalitarianism [73] (p. 656). It is
therefore plausible to suggest that theoretical differences in the conceptions of the good do not and
would not shadow the rationality of extraterritorial legislative attempts that much in reality.
Second, we fully acknowledge that the implementation of extraterritorial legislative initiatives
involves tackling conflicting moral values in different countries, which somehow connects to the
perennial debate between relativism and absolutivism. After all, absolutivism mainly functions at the
level of cognizance rather than practice, and thus conceals the pragmatic risk of conflicts among nations.
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This is also where the Achilles’ heel of international law lies, referring to the fact that global international
law norms have to be interpreted and enforced through disparate domestic mechanisms [76]. To take
regulating slavery in a global supply chain context as an example, while slavery is condemned by
multiple international instruments for it being injurious to the rights to liberty, the inherent dignity
and physical integrity of human beings, and as such norms prohibiting this type of behaviour are
indisputable as jus cogens [77] (art. 5), the state of jus cogens does not dispose of most “ordinary value
conflicts among different bodies of law” [28] (p. 67). Issues that require clarification in imposing and
enforcing anti-slavery legislation remain open to different ways of interpretation in different cultures,
underpinned by the diversity of national culture and moral values [78] (p. 320).
To tackle this problem, we propose that extraterritorial legislative and implementation approaches
need to be prudently designed so as to be adequately reflexive and flexible, particularly in terms
of their content and structures, so as to avoid the risk of practically treating other states who hold
controversial conceptions of the good with disrespect. In simple words, there is more than one way
to achieve the aim of extraterritoriality. For instance, the issue of territoriality and extraterritoriality
are not purely binary; there are domestic measures that have extraterritorial implications and could
be exercised in relation to egregious activities abroad, s.7(1) of the UK Bribery Act being a typical
example. This type of lawmaking has primary force on domestic companies and indirectly induces
those commercial organisations to place proactive controlling measures on related third parties within
its global business proximity. It thus meshes better with a pluralistic world, in comparison to the
method of directly granting extraterritorial force to domestic courts and laws. It takes into account the
extensive economic and political powers of MNEs, relying on those global giants’ established internal
networks and control devices, without substantially infringing the territorial-based jurisdiction ideal
that conventional conflict of laws holds dear.
Third, we propose the importance of aligning legal discourse with social science definitions, as this
would help to illuminate the essential socio-economic elements of the regulated subject. To take the
crime of slavery as an example, the 1926 Slavery Convention provides a dominating legal definition,
focussing on the powers pertaining to the rights of ownership [78] (p. 282). However, in practice,
cases of slavery are often first dealt with by workers in social services or human rights organisations,
who would find it difficult to comprehend the attributes of ownership that apply with the law of property.
Hence, in practice social scientists have provided operational guidelines, and usefully summarise
control, use, management, and profit as “instances of ownership” that characterise patterned activities
of slavery [79]. This practice has proved functional in accommodating the varied and constantly
evolving social reality—for instance, in effectively identifying modern forms of slavery, which have
transformed to become more concealed and dynamic [5] (p. 331). This approach may be applied more
broadly in other extraterritorial legal initiatives to make them reflexive to the complexity and diversity
of social communities. Operational social science guidelines set in the relevant social and cultural
contexts, such as values and standards inherent to “the commons” and “the common good”, are thus
needed to supplement the universal legal definition, so as to ensure a general applicability in both the
legal realm and the empirical fields.
6. Introducing “the Extraterritorial Commons” to Achieve “the Global Common Good”
6.1. From “the Global Commons” to “the Extraterritorial Commons”
Understanding of “the commons” has thus far been human-centric, since the origins, operations
and ultimate purposes of all institutions can be traced back to natural human beings. Corporations as
social constructs are likewise established to serve the interests of human beings, individually or in
groups. This human-centric principle is thus seen as the golden rule for understanding the relationship
between “the common good” and personal good.
Contrasting with the pursuit of narrow self-interest [80], “the common good” and “the commons”
have been discussed since ancient times in terms of “the public good” for the purpose of “social equity
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and livelihoods” [81]. They indicate the goods that serve every individual member collectively within a
society/community and its institutions. In this view, “the commons” is “natural or human-made resource
systems that are or that could be enjoyed collectively” [82] (p. 120). Similarly, we appreciate the concept
of “the common good” with the emphasis upon ethical goals of promoting more socially responsible
companies and the importance of protecting vulnerable parties, both domestically and extraterritorially.
Therefore, “the commons” can be employed as a useful rationale to explicate legislative attempts in
relation to corporate extraterritorial responsibility going forward, whereas the “common good” is
the ultimate goal for adopting these legislative measures as “the end of law” [83]. Individual human
beings connected to an MNE are expected to share common resources such as a safe and healthy
working environment, and they also contribute together to the long-term interest of the company.
Therefore, “the common good” of corporations relies very much on “the common good” of all the
individual stakeholder groups that contribute to corporate success, and who are mostly human beings.
For an MNE, these people include stakeholders in the parent company, its foreign affiliates and partners
in global supply chains. These foreign affiliates and global supply chain partners also tend to be in
countries with lower labour or environmental standards because of weak institutional and fragile
legal settings, and stakeholders in these jurisdictions are more likely to be vulnerable and may easily
be exposed to social and environmental harms. Therefore, “the common good” of MNEs should be
defined broadly to include the consideration of “the global common good”.
“The global common good” is rational and necessary, considering that a number of MNEs have
been found to be taking advantage of weak accountability systems and poor enforcement of laws in
developing countries, using them as safe havens for profit-making at the expense of sustainability [84].
The scope of “the common good” must be globalised in order to strike a balance between the business
environments of home and host states. The notion of “the global common good” also supports the
argument that more channels should be provided to stakeholders who engage with MNEs or their
subsidiaries in order for them to have access to justice, especially in cases where there is limited access
to justice for poor and marginalised communities in these stakeholders’ home countries [85].
At this global level, the term “global commons” embraces areas and natural resources beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction, shared by the international community as a whole and over which
no state can exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights [86]. “The global commons” is established through
collective actions including the interests of all stakeholders to attain “the global common good”,
which focuses on international cooperation and the protection of stakeholders beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction [87]. In terms of “the commons” that are consumed by MNEs in host states,
it is rational and helpful for us to define these as “extraterritorial commons”, which includes things
that extraterritorial citizens inherit, such as resources that have been consumed or created jointly by
citizens and MNEs. In this manner, we define “the extraterritorial commons” as collective shared
natural or human-made resources among MNEs, their stakeholder groups and the subsidiaries
in home and host states of the MNEs. The notion accommodates both natural resources that are
vulnerable to overuse in the host states of MNEs and what is achieved by corporate citizenship,
via the collective actions of all stakeholders and the active participation of MNEs in home states.
These rich implications of “the extraterritorial commons” reflect the aspirational impact of the notion in
tackling global sustainability challenges through ethical corporate conducts and protecting vulnerable
parties, both domestically and extraterritorially. According to this notion, MNEs should help in the
regeneration of natural resources rather than just exploiting the resources in host states and communities.
MNEs should also share the common goods available in their home states with stakeholders in host
states where appropriate, especially new common goods such as knowledge commons and intellectual
property commons.
6.2. Function, Nature and Scope of “the Extraterritorial Commons”
“The extraterritorial commons”, similar to “the commons” [88] but with a more specific focus, is a
useful theoretical core to support global efforts in tackling social, environmental and human rights
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challenges. While “the commons” is seen as an alternative to neo-liberalism for creating wealth [89],
“the extraterritorial commons” is a useful tool for progressive policy makers and change-makers with a
focus on issues beyond home states and corporations’ wealth-making instincts. It helps to expand
the scope of “the commons” with a specific focus on host states, as well as the extensive pursuit of
“the common good”, in terms of what is shared and beneficial for the wellbeing of every individual
of a community achieved through collective participation [56]. It also contributes to expanding the
connotation of “common goods” as merely economic goods, emphasising the limited availability of
resources shared by people in developing countries who are vulnerable to abuse [90]. The companies
or corporate groups, as communities of individuals, are expected to perform as both domestic and
extraterritorial participants, delivering cooperative activities to provide goods and services in an
efficient, competitive and profitable manner, and working together to achieve the common good [55].
No matter whether we are concerned with preserving the clean water resources of local communities,
or protecting the health and safety of vulnerable employees in the least developed countries, the notion
of “extraterritorial commons” could usefully draw the attention of policymakers and the controllers
of MNEs towards resolving these social challenges faced by vulnerable stakeholder groups, by way
of designing and performing relevant rules and policies such as due diligence and transparency
requirements, to effectively respond to the social complexities of the global corporate world. This is
particularly important when vulnerable parties may not be able to get access to additional care or
justice in their home jurisdictions, owing to the lack of effective legal systems.
“The extraterritorial commons” is in harmony with progressive legal attempts in reality [91,92]
which seek to surpass existing mainstream recognitions of corporate extraterritorial responsibilities
as voluntary in nature. It is also consistent with “the global commons” since the international legal
system allows for conceptualisations of “shared responsibility” between states and MNEs [93] (p. 91).
The notion also serves as a useful tool for ascertaining the content of new legal duties emanating from
the need to create sustainable MNEs, in a global context that is overwhelmed by growing concern
about the planetary environment, particularly when there is no well-functioning legal deterrent to
corporate wrongdoings in the international arena or a globalised compensatory regime available to
the injured. While there is an absence of “consistency and certainty as to the means and methods by which
extraterritoriality is asserted” [94] (p. 156), “the extraterritorial commons” could at least serve as a
criterion or benchmark for testing the legitimacy of extraterritorial legislation.
6.3. MNEs as an Integrated Part of “the Commons” and the Task of Corporate Law
A company, as a separate legal entity, is regarded as “a resource which is subject to multiple, overlapping
and sometimes conflicting claims on its use”, while “the commons” is seen as collectively held rights of
access, withdrawal, management and exclusion in relation to a resource [95] (p. 368). Common-pool
resources can be human-made resources, where one person’s use subtracts from another’s and where
it is often necessary, but difficult and costly, to exclude other users outside the group from using the
resource. In MNEs, these resources can include corporate reputation, supply chains and stakeholder
networks. An MNE is a multifaceted community with shared contracts, agreements and culture [96].
Business networks with the participation of MNEs always involve “the global commons” and generate
expectations for “the extraterritorial commons” due to the stakeholder networks involved, including the
environment, local governments and communities outside their territory.
The scope of stakeholders in MNEs will go beyond the corporation’s home state [97], and claims
are even more complicated since they most likely take into account extraterritorial interests. For the
purpose of achieving “the globalised common good”, stakeholders in MNEs are categorised as global
stakeholders that operate in the global “meta-environment” [98]. These stakeholders represent “global
interests” and are regulated under both the home and the host institutional environments under the
“meta-environment”. As in the case Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell plc [99] involving 42,500 claimants
against the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. for pollution emitted in the
Nigerian local community, these stakeholders can be seen as taking a progressive approach to stimulate
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social and ecological development, by advocating the significance of “the extraterritorial commons”
and taking a coordinated and enlarged approach to enhance corporate responsibility.
Within the environment of “the commons”, market mechanisms themselves sometimes bring
ruin to the users of “the commons”, and markets can no longer make everything “right” [100]
(p. 278). Therefore, it is recommended that the only solution to the problem of “the commons” is
“mutual” coercion, despite the fact that few businesses like or enjoy coercion [101] (p. 1247). In the
business environment under which MNEs have to fulfil their corporate responsibility, corporate
law provides mandatory approaches to intervene, correct or save a company or environment from
“ruin”. Legal force can be useful in directing or altering corporate behaviours in order to promote
extraterritorial sustainability. Corporate law should play a proactive role in governing MNEs as
“the commons”, and give legitimacy to users and controllers of “the commons” to facilitate the
implementation of various duties and rights internally [63] (pp. 20–21), [102].
Corporate laws are normally drafted and implemented at the national level. The allocation
and governance of “the commons” involve shifting decision-making responsibilities down to the
local level, or seeking to build trust among local actors and authorities [103]. Corporate law has
multiple functions, including the allocation of rights, particularly specifying the conditions under
which various stakeholders may draw on MNEs’ resources, distributing corporate profits and resources,
and sustaining the company’s common asset pool as a source for progressive corporate values [95]
(p. 369). Mandatory corporate extraterritorial duties may provide effective means for extraterritorial
stakeholders to draw on MNEs’ resources when fair and necessary. Thus, MNEs may be seen as “the
commons”, including elements of “the extraterritorial commons”, to support a wider framework of
corporate regulation.
6.4. “The Tragedy of the Commons” in the Extraterritorial Context and Shared Responsibility
Arguments for extraterritorial corporate responsibility are also subject to some objections.
One of the most influential arguments against extraterritorial corporate responsibility is unpoliced
directorial discretion and inherent conflicts of interest among various groups of stakeholders [104].
However, offering a particular user “priority over the others in the use it can make of common resources
and in its power to hold the managers of the resource to account” is incompatible with the sustainability
of resources over the long term [95] (p. 378). If extraterritorial corporate responsibility is applied
through or supported by the idea of “the extraterritorial commons” for “the global common good”,
the individual or personal good would be a contributor to “the commons” with the shared goal of “the
common good”. Changes thus need to be made to the conventional belief that MNEs are more likely
to be part of the problem than part of the solution, when it comes to the question of protecting “the
common good” [105]. The goal of “the common good” is a good in the company’s own right, in order
to achieve the goals of both the company and its inseparable team players. “The common good” of the
company is created by the contributions and interventions of its stakeholders, including extraterritorial
stakeholders. They not only provide their particular capital to contribute to the company’s “common
good”, but also create a harmonious business environment or conditions in which every stakeholder
receives a fair and reasonable share by virtue of their contribution to the company.
Furthermore, according to arguments surrounding “the tragedy of the commons”, the motivation to
prioritise private gain over the common good has meant that common pool resources are fundamentally
subject to a tendency to degradation, leading to “ruin to all” [101] (p. 1244), [106]. “The tragedy of the
commons” could also refer to a worrying situation in a global shared-resource system where powerful
MNEs act independently for their own self-interests, behaving contrary to “the common good” of
extraterritorial users by depleting or spoiling resources in developing countries. These developing
countries tend to have less bargaining power and desperately need the MNEs’ investment. There is
also a lack of regulation to limit the amount of a “common good” resource that is available to any
individual corporation, which could perhaps be achieved via a well-functioning permit system or
social licence to operate [107].
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Hardin’s thesis [101] can be applied to MNEs’ extraterritorial responsibility in order to support
the rationale for “shared responsibility” of MNEs beyond their home states and avoid the tragedy of
“ruin for all”. Policymakers need to determine how to set conditions, such as the conditions under
which individual MNEs cannot exploit “the extraterritorial commons” beyond their domestic territory,
taking advantage of existing regulatory gaps. Corporate law could be the right tool to fill this gap,
and the notion of “the extraterritorial commons” would be a suitable norm to achieve the goal of “the
common good”.
6.5. The Enforcement of “Extraterritorial Commons”: Legislative Reform and Contribution from the Board
Accountability Mechanism
“The extraterritorial commons” will assist policy makers to include the interests of extraterritorial
stakeholders, particularly the most vulnerable who engage with companies or their subsidiaries,
into legislative reform agendas. This is not limited to state lawmaking; it may well include regional
legal solutions. Taking European Union law as an example, the non-financial reporting directive
2014/95/EU constructed a regulatory framework for CSR reporting that requires large companies to
disclose information on how they operate and manage social and environmental challenges [108].
The requirements may also accelerate progressive corporate decisions at the regional level by mandating
due diligence and seeking information about the behaviour of subsidiaries and suppliers. Giving the
fact that current studies tend to focus on one single jurisdiction and examine national transpositions
of the directive [109,110] without delineating the extraterritorial scope and content of the report,
“the extraterritorial commons” may also be regarded as useful theoretical support for coherently
interpreting this directive by including extraterritorial elements and extending the arm of the member
states beyond their territory. In order to address extraterritorial corporate abuses and mitigate
vulnerabilities in global corporate settings, particularly in developing countries, “the extraterritorial
commons” could help law-makers to introduce and eligible companies to comply with transparency
requirements with the inclusion of strategies to deal with extraterritorial environmental, social and
human rights challenges in their overseas subsidiaries and global supply chains, such as employee
health and safety protection issues or bribery.
“The extraterritorial commons” may also be enforced through the lens of companies’ extraterritorial
responsibility by conducting adaptive governance for complex and uncertain systems [111]. A few
elements of adaptive governance in complex systems are particularly well suited in terms of the
enforcement of corporate extraterritorial responsibility through board accountability mechanisms.
These elements include providing trustworthy information about resource stocks, dealing with
conflicts that may arise among all constituencies within the scope of the global commons,
encouraging compliance through both formal and informal mechanisms, and designing institutions
to allow for adaptation [111]. These requirements also match the four stages of achieving board
accountability [112], including the board providing accurate information, the board explaining and
justifying their decisions and responsibilities, various constituencies’ questioning and evaluation of
the rationale for board judgements and behaviours, and finally the imposition of consequences. In this
manner, compliance could be achieved through effective intervention from various constituencies who
share the collective aim of “the common good”.
The effectiveness of enforcement in relation to the governance of “the extraterritorial commons”
depends not only on competent resource supervision and the monitoring of users, but also on the
success of coordinating governance at different levels—for example, contributions may also come from
soft law, other quasi-legal instruments or voluntary approaches.
To sum up, for the purpose of developing a theoretical framework in support of extraterritorial
legislative moves on MNEs, we have put forward a new concept of “the extraterritorial commons”, in the
hope of achieving “the global common good” in the global corporate context. Reflecting on the social
and pragmatic weights carried by MNEs’ extraterritorial activities, the reasons why “the extraterritorial
commons” could be a useful tool for progressive policy makers and change-makers are discussed.
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At a more practical level, we have also addressed the justification for offering appropriate care for
extraterritorial stakeholders via the lens of “the extraterritorial commons”. The relationship between
progressive legal attempts and “the extraterritorial commons” in the context of the international legal
system which allows for conceptualisations of “shared responsibility” between states and MNEs is
also explicated. The interconnections between various concepts and arguments that construct the
conceptual framework surrounding “the extraterritorial commons” are depicted in Figure 2 below.
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A limitation of this article is that it is unable to fully investigate the enforcement status of
“the extraterritorial commons” in the contexts of individual jurisdictions and various industries.
Further research on the adoption and adaptation of the notion in individual states’ legislations will be
beneficial, both academically and practically. Furthermore, since sustainability challenges appear to be
industry sensitive, it is also worthwhile to discuss the nature and scope of “the extraterritorial commons”,
particularly in the context of CSR-sensitive industries such as oil and gas and tourism [113,114].
7. Conclusions
Despite the fact that the vulnerability of “the global commons” can now be addressed in
an era of remarkable peace among the superpowers [86], the goals of fairness and equality
are still often undermined by failures to protect vulnerable parties in the operation of MNEs.
In the absence of int rnationally recognised and followed principles for t ckling these challenges,
extrat ritorial legislative ap aches have e n introduced in various forms. These approach s,
which contribute to the trajectory of mitigating socio-economi disparities and regulate corporations’
extraterritorial conduct, may bridge governance gaps so that transnational chains of accountability
may b built.
Despite its growing popularity and prog essive legislative g als, the rationale behind the
emergence of corporate extraterritorial responsibility is an understudied area. The lack of solid
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theoretical foundations has always been a concern for extraterritorial legislative attempts to promote
more sustainable companies. It will not only weaken the legitimacy of various nations’ and regions’
lawmaking attempts, but also make any formulation of the corporate responsibilities towards
extraterritorial stakeholders arbitrary and unenforceable. This article presents a convincing case
by using the notions of “the commons” and “the common good”, and further introducing an original
concept of “the extraterritorial commons”, consistent with the idea of “the global commons”.
As an important component of “the global commons”, “the extraterritorial commons” is a
prerequisite for “the common good” in the global business environment. The notion will support
policy makers to promote more accountable MNEs and encourage a management culture taking
account of “the extraterritorial commons” in order to mitigate negative impacts caused by these
powerful corporate entities with complex organisational structures. It will also bridge the legislative
rationale and directors’ decision-making, and make corporate extraterritorial responsibility sensible,
logical and convincing.
The notion of “the extraterritorial commons”, as explicated in Section 6 in detail, provides a
solid theoretical background for corporate law legislative approaches beyond companies’ domestic
territories. This notion will be particularly helpful when transnational disputes between companies,
which often involve extraterritorial issues, cannot be settled through contracts, negotiation, arbitration,
or any of the other dispute settlement means commonly applied within the traditional business context.
With the expected increasing trajectory of litigation against MNEs in developed countries in relation
to their extraterritorial conduct, a clear policy response to this legislative need is important at both
the national and international levels. “The extraterritorial commons”, as presented, may serve as a
criterion for legislative consistency and rationalisation.
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